* fix: block private-IP webhook URLs to close SSRF on caller-controlled URL
post_webhook(url, ...) in utils/webhook.py forwards the URL straight to
aiohttp.ClientSession.post with no SSRF gate. The URL is caller-controlled
on two surfaces:
- User notification settings under ENABLE_USER_WEBHOOKS=true — any
authenticated user can set the URL their notifications POST to.
- Automation notification triggers (calendar alerts, etc.).
Without a gate, the URL can target cloud metadata (169.254.169.254 /
fd00:ec2::254), localhost-bound services, RFC1918 internal hosts, or any
other private address reachable from the server process. Blind SSRF — no
response body returned to the caller — but enough to enumerate internal
services via response timing / status codes, and on cloud deployments
enough to issue requests against IMDSv1 if available.
Call validate_url() at the top of post_webhook. The function blocks
private/reserved IPs when ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH is False (the
default), is the project's chosen SSRF gate, and is already applied to
the equivalent fetch surfaces (retrieval, image-load, OAuth profile
picture). Operators who legitimately need to webhook to private IPs
(internal monitoring, self-hosted Slack alternatives, etc.) can set
ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH=True — same opt-out as the other gated
surfaces.
Scope intentionally limited to webhooks. The OAuth discovery and
external reranker paths cwanglab also flagged are admin-configured with
intentional private-IP defaults (reranker defaults to
http://localhost:8080/v1/rerank) and are out of scope per Rule 9 — the
admin owns the URL choice and the operator opt-out exists for them too.
Reported by cwanglab in GHSA-5x9f-85cg-w3hf (cluster canonical with six
closed siblings: g36v-23gj-j69x, 6j8f-h58v-xgmw, xpwv-52pm-p8hj,
v9gp-hv2c-9qv8, fw7w-jrw7-p3v9, x7xq-74rg-m8mf).
Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: also pass allow_redirects=False on webhook post_webhook session.post
Companion to the previous commit. validate_url() only validates the
initial URL; aiohttp's default allow_redirects=True would still follow
a 302 to a private-IP target. Same redirect-bypass class as the rh5x
cluster's five call sites, sixth call site to receive the same gate.
Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>
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Co-authored-by: cwanglab <cwanglab@users.noreply.github.com>
The Qdrant backends implemented delete(ids=...) as a payload filter on
metadata.id, but points are stored with the item id as the Qdrant point id
(see _create_points), and not every point carries an id in its payload.
Memory points store only {created_at} in metadata (KB metadata embeddings
likewise), so deleting a single memory matched nothing and left an orphaned
vector that kept being injected into RAG context.
Delete by point id instead: PointIdsList for the standard backend, and a
tenant-scoped HasIdCondition for multitenancy (point ids are unique, so tenant
isolation is preserved). Filter-based deletion is unchanged.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The static credentials OAuth flow currently sets scope=None, relying on
the OAuth provider's default scopes. This breaks providers like GitHub
that default to minimal/public-only access when no scope is requested.
This change reads scopes_supported from the Protected Resource Metadata
document (RFC 9728) and uses them in the authorization request. Unlike
the Authorization Server's scopes_supported (a full catalog of every
scope the AS can grant), the PRM scopes_supported represents what the
specific resource requires — making it safe to request without breaking
providers like Entra ID that reject broad scope requests.
Fixes the regression introduced in 349ea4ea where all scope handling was
removed from the static flow.
* fix: gate chat_completion channel: branch on channel access + message scoping
When chat_id starts with 'channel:' the chat-completion handler skips
the chat ownership / storage block below it. Nothing replaced that
gate. The downstream channel emitter in socket/main.py:_make_channel_
emitter writes to Messages.update_message_by_id using a caller-supplied
message_id pulled from form_data['id'], with no membership check, no
write-access check, and no validation that the message_id belongs to
the channel.
Net effect: any authenticated user could submit
chat_id='channel:<any-channel-uuid>' + id='<any-message-uuid>' and
overwrite that message with attacker-controlled LLM output. Cross-
channel writes worked too — private channels, DMs, channels the
caller has no access to. Original author attribution stayed intact on
the overwritten row.
Add the missing checks at the channel: branch:
1. Channel must exist (404 otherwise).
2. Non-admin caller must have write access to the channel — membership
for group/dm channels, AccessGrants permission='write' for others.
3. The message_id (if supplied) must belong to the same channel — a
caller with write access to channel A cannot use this path to
overwrite a message in channel B.
Behaviour change is limited to callers who were exploiting the gap:
legitimate flows that supply a message_id under their own channel
membership continue to work unchanged.
Co-authored-by: sfwani <sfwani@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: trim verbose comment on channel: branch gate
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Co-authored-by: sfwani <sfwani@users.noreply.github.com>
The query_memory endpoint embeds the search query without the configured
RAG_EMBEDDING_QUERY_PREFIX, while every RAG retrieval path in
retrieval/utils.py correctly passes it. Instruction-tuned embedding
models (e.g. Qwen3-Embedding) produce poor results without the prefix,
causing memory search to return semantically unrelated results.
- Introduced skills functionality in Chat.svelte, MessageInput.svelte, and related components.
- Added SkillsModal for displaying and managing available skills.
- Updated state management to include selectedSkillIds and integrate skills API.
- Enhanced UI to show available skills and their descriptions.
- Updated translations to support skills-related text.
Timothy Jaeryang Baek