Files
dokploy/apps/dokploy/server/api/routers/user.ts
T
github-actions[bot] a07106d649 🚀 Release v0.29.5 (#4475)
* fix(migrate-auth-secret): exit cleanly when there are no 2FA records

The empty-records branch of `main()` returned without calling
`process.exit(0)`, leaving the Drizzle Postgres connection pool
holding the event loop open. The `migrate-auth-secret` process
then hangs indefinitely after printing "No 2FA records found,
nothing to migrate." causing the upstream `0.29.3.sh` security
migration script (which calls this via `docker exec`) to never
reach its final `docker service update` step that mounts the new
Docker Secret. Operators end up with the new secret created but
the dokploy service still configured with the hardcoded
`BETTER_AUTH_SECRET`, while believing the migration completed.

Match the success branch a few lines below which already does
`process.exit(0)`, and the pattern used in sibling scripts
`reset-password.ts` and `reset-2fa.ts`.

Closes #4392

* feat(compose): add import from base64 in create service dropdown

Adds an "Import" option to the Create Service dropdown that lets users
paste a base64-encoded compose export, preview the template (compose YAML,
domains, envs, mounts) before confirming, and create the service only on
confirm. Adds a `previewTemplate` tRPC procedure that processes the base64
without touching the DB, with server access validation via session.

* [autofix.ci] apply automated fixes

* Enhance version synchronization workflow to include SDK repository

- Updated the GitHub Actions workflow to sync versioning across MCP, CLI, and SDK repositories.
- Added steps to bump the version in the SDK repository and regenerate tools from the latest OpenAPI spec.
- Improved commit message formatting to include source and release information for all repositories.
- Ensured successful synchronization messages for each repository after the version update.

* feat(deployment): add readLogs procedure to fetch deployment logs

- Introduced a new `readLogs` procedure that allows users to retrieve logs for a specific deployment by providing the deployment ID and an optional tail parameter.
- Implemented permission checks to ensure users have access to the requested logs.
- Enhanced log retrieval for both cloud and non-cloud environments, utilizing appropriate commands based on the server context.

Resolve https://github.com/Dokploy/mcp/issues/14

* feat(deployment): add server access validation for deployment actions

- Implemented server access validation in deployment procedures to ensure users can only access deployments associated with their active organization.
- Added checks to throw an UNAUTHORIZED error if a user attempts to access a deployment linked to a server outside their organization.

This enhancement improves security and access control within the deployment management system.

* feat(organization): prevent inviting users with owner role

- Added validation to prevent users from being invited with the owner role in the organization and user routers.
- Implemented TRPCError responses to ensure proper error handling when attempting to assign the owner role.
This change enhances role management and security within the organization structure.

https://github.com/Dokploy/dokploy/security/advisories/GHSA-fm9p-wmpw-gxjh

* feat(user): implement session cleanup on user update

- Added functionality to delete old sessions when a user updates their password, ensuring that only the current session remains active.
- This change enhances security by preventing unauthorized access from previous sessions after a password change.

Close here https://github.com/Dokploy/dokploy/security/advisories/GHSA-rr9m-w87g-46f3

* feat(settings): add copy button to server IP in web server settings (#4397)

* fix: copy Dokploy server IP when clicking server badge (#4390)

* fix: copy Dokploy server IP when clicking server badge

When a service runs on the local Dokploy server (no remote server),
clicking the server badge did nothing because `data.server` is null.
Now falls back to the server IP from settings so the badge always
copies an IP address.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(copy-ip): implement IP address copying functionality across database service components

- Added the ability to copy the server IP address to the clipboard when clicking the server badge in various database service components (Libsql, MariaDB, MongoDB, MySQL, PostgreSQL, Redis).
- Integrated the `copy-to-clipboard` library and `sonner` for user feedback upon successful copy action.
- Ensured fallback to the server IP from settings when the service data is not available, enhancing user experience and functionality.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mauricio Siu <siumauricio@icloud.com>

* fix: responsive layout (#4391)

Signed-off-by: Nahidujjaman Hridoy <hridoyboss12@gmail.com>

* fix: automatically converting username to lowercase both in creation of register, and build for extra. (#4382)

* fix: allow square brackets in zip path validation for Next.js dynamic routes (#4468)

* fix: allow square brackets in zip drop path validation for Next.js dynamic routes

ZIP uploads containing Next.js dynamic route files (e.g. app/api/[id]/route.ts,
pages/[slug].tsx) were rejected by readValidDirectory because the path regex
did not include square bracket characters.

* [autofix.ci] apply automated fixes

---------

Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: prevent webhook deploy crash when commit data lacks modified files (#4470)

shouldDeploy passed undefined/null entries from commit.modified straight
into micromatch, which throws "Expected input to be a string" and fails
every webhook deployment when watch paths are configured. Filter out
non-string values before matching.

* fix: add type="button" to TooltipTrigger in form components to prevent accidental submission (#4422)

Co-authored-by: Maks Pikov <mixelburg@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix: enable comment toggle shortcut in env variable editor (#4402) (#4473)

* fix: add tls=true label for domains when certificateType is none (#4018) (#4474)

* fix: add tls=true label for compose domains when certificateType is none (#4018)

* test: cover tls=true label for certificateType none, require https

* fix: scope tls fix to compose labels, leave traefik file config unchanged (#4018)

* chore: update version to v0.29.5 in package.json

---------

Signed-off-by: Nahidujjaman Hridoy <hridoyboss12@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: ngenohkevin <ngenohkevin19@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mauricio Siu <47042324+Siumauricio@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mauricio Siu <siumauricio@icloud.com>
Co-authored-by: autofix-ci[bot] <114827586+autofix-ci[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Volodymyr Kravchuk <volodymyr.kravch@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Nahidujjaman Hridoy <75487507+nhridoy@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Francis <9560564+Baker@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mixelburg <52622705+mixelburg@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Maks Pikov <mixelburg@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-05-22 17:21:12 -06:00

732 lines
18 KiB
TypeScript

import {
createApiKey,
createOrganizationUserWithCredentials,
findNotificationById,
findOrganizationById,
findUserById,
getDokployUrl,
getUserByToken,
getWebServerSettings,
IS_CLOUD,
removeUserById,
renderInvitationEmail,
sendEmailNotification,
sendResendNotification,
updateUser,
} from "@dokploy/server";
import { db } from "@dokploy/server/db";
import {
account,
apiAssignPermissions,
apiFindOneToken,
apikey,
apiUpdateUser,
invitation,
member,
session,
user,
} from "@dokploy/server/db/schema";
import {
hasPermission,
resolvePermissions,
} from "@dokploy/server/services/permission";
import { hasValidLicense } from "@dokploy/server/services/proprietary/license-key";
import { TRPCError } from "@trpc/server";
import * as bcrypt from "bcrypt";
import { and, asc, eq, gt, ne } from "drizzle-orm";
import { z } from "zod";
import { audit } from "@/server/api/utils/audit";
import {
adminProcedure,
createTRPCRouter,
protectedProcedure,
publicProcedure,
withPermission,
} from "../trpc";
const apiCreateApiKey = z.object({
name: z.string().min(1),
prefix: z.string().optional(),
expiresIn: z.number().optional(),
metadata: z.object({
organizationId: z.string(),
}),
// Rate limiting
rateLimitEnabled: z.boolean().optional(),
rateLimitTimeWindow: z.number().optional(),
rateLimitMax: z.number().optional(),
// Request limiting
remaining: z.number().optional(),
refillAmount: z.number().optional(),
refillInterval: z.number().optional(),
});
export const userRouter = createTRPCRouter({
all: withPermission("member", "read").query(async ({ ctx }) => {
return await db.query.member.findMany({
where: eq(member.organizationId, ctx.session.activeOrganizationId),
with: {
user: true,
},
orderBy: [asc(member.createdAt)],
});
}),
one: protectedProcedure
.input(
z.object({
userId: z.string(),
}),
)
.query(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
const memberResult = await db.query.member.findFirst({
where: and(
eq(member.userId, input.userId),
eq(member.organizationId, ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId || ""),
),
with: {
user: true,
},
});
// If user not found in the organization, deny access
if (!memberResult) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "NOT_FOUND",
message: "User not found in this organization",
});
}
// Allow access if:
// 1. User is requesting their own information
// 2. User is owner/admin
// 3. User has member.update permission (custom roles managing permissions)
if (
memberResult.userId !== ctx.user.id &&
ctx.user.role !== "owner" &&
ctx.user.role !== "admin"
) {
const canUpdate = await hasPermission(ctx, { member: ["update"] });
if (!canUpdate) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "UNAUTHORIZED",
message: "You are not authorized to access this user",
});
}
}
return memberResult;
}),
session: publicProcedure.query(async ({ ctx }) => {
if (!ctx.user || !ctx.session || !ctx.session.activeOrganizationId) {
return null;
}
return {
user: {
id: ctx.user.id,
},
session: {
activeOrganizationId: ctx.session.activeOrganizationId,
},
};
}),
get: protectedProcedure.query(async ({ ctx }) => {
const memberResult = await db.query.member.findFirst({
where: and(
eq(member.userId, ctx.user.id),
eq(member.organizationId, ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId || ""),
),
with: {
user: {
with: {
apiKeys: true,
},
},
},
});
return memberResult;
}),
getPermissions: protectedProcedure.query(async ({ ctx }) => {
return resolvePermissions(ctx);
}),
haveRootAccess: protectedProcedure.query(async ({ ctx }) => {
if (!IS_CLOUD) {
return false;
}
if (
process.env.USER_ADMIN_ID === ctx.user.id ||
ctx.session?.impersonatedBy === process.env.USER_ADMIN_ID
) {
return true;
}
return false;
}),
getBackups: adminProcedure.query(async ({ ctx }) => {
const memberResult = await db.query.member.findFirst({
where: and(
eq(member.userId, ctx.user.id),
eq(member.organizationId, ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId || ""),
),
with: {
user: {
with: {
backups: {
with: {
destination: true,
deployments: true,
},
},
apiKeys: true,
},
},
},
});
return memberResult?.user;
}),
getServerMetrics: withPermission("monitoring", "read").query(
async ({ ctx }) => {
const memberResult = await db.query.member.findFirst({
where: and(
eq(member.userId, ctx.user.id),
eq(member.organizationId, ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId || ""),
),
with: {
user: true,
},
});
return memberResult?.user;
},
),
update: protectedProcedure
.input(apiUpdateUser)
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
if (input.password || input.currentPassword) {
const currentAuth = await db.query.account.findFirst({
where: eq(account.userId, ctx.user.id),
});
const correctPassword = bcrypt.compareSync(
input.currentPassword || "",
currentAuth?.password || "",
);
if (!correctPassword) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",
message: "Current password is incorrect",
});
}
if (!input.password) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",
message: "New password is required",
});
}
await db
.update(account)
.set({
password: bcrypt.hashSync(input.password, 10),
})
.where(eq(account.userId, ctx.user.id));
await db
.delete(session)
.where(
and(
eq(session.userId, ctx.user.id),
ne(session.id, ctx.session.id),
),
);
}
try {
const result = await updateUser(ctx.user.id, input);
await audit(ctx, {
action: "update",
resourceType: "user",
resourceId: ctx.user.id,
resourceName: ctx.user.email,
});
return result;
} catch (error) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",
message:
error instanceof Error ? error.message : "Failed to update user",
});
}
}),
getUserByToken: publicProcedure
.input(apiFindOneToken)
.query(async ({ input }) => {
return await getUserByToken(input.token);
}),
getMetricsToken: withPermission("monitoring", "read").query(
async ({ ctx }) => {
const user = await findUserById(ctx.user.ownerId);
const settings = await getWebServerSettings();
return {
serverIp: settings?.serverIp,
enabledFeatures: user.enablePaidFeatures,
metricsConfig: settings?.metricsConfig,
};
},
),
remove: protectedProcedure
.input(
z.object({
userId: z.string(),
}),
)
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
if (IS_CLOUD) {
return true;
}
// Ensure the acting user has admin privileges in the active organization
if (ctx.user.role !== "owner" && ctx.user.role !== "admin") {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "FORBIDDEN",
message: "Only owners or admins can delete users",
});
}
// Fetch target member within the active organization
const targetMember = await db.query.member.findFirst({
where: and(
eq(member.userId, input.userId),
eq(member.organizationId, ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId || ""),
),
});
if (!targetMember) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "NOT_FOUND",
message: "Target user is not a member of this organization",
});
}
// Never allow deleting the organization owner via this endpoint
if (targetMember.role === "owner") {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "FORBIDDEN",
message: "You cannot delete the organization owner",
});
}
// Admin self-protection: an admin cannot delete themselves
if (targetMember.role === "admin" && input.userId === ctx.user.id) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "FORBIDDEN",
message:
"Admins cannot delete themselves. Ask the owner or another admin.",
});
}
// Only owners can delete admins
// Admins can only delete members
if (ctx.user.role === "admin" && targetMember.role === "admin") {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "FORBIDDEN",
message:
"Only the organization owner can delete admins. Admins can only delete members.",
});
}
const result = await removeUserById(input.userId);
await audit(ctx, {
action: "delete",
resourceType: "user",
resourceId: input.userId,
});
return result;
}),
assignPermissions: withPermission("member", "update")
.input(apiAssignPermissions)
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
try {
const organization = await findOrganizationById(
ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId || "",
);
if (organization?.ownerId !== ctx.user.ownerId) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "UNAUTHORIZED",
message: "You are not allowed to assign permissions",
});
}
const { id, accessedGitProviders, accessedServers, ...rest } = input;
const licensed = await hasValidLicense(
ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId || "",
);
await db
.update(member)
.set({
...rest,
...(licensed && accessedGitProviders !== undefined
? { accessedGitProviders }
: {}),
...(licensed && accessedServers !== undefined
? { accessedServers }
: {}),
})
.where(
and(
eq(member.userId, input.id),
eq(
member.organizationId,
ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId || "",
),
),
);
await audit(ctx, {
action: "update",
resourceType: "user",
resourceId: input.id,
metadata: { permissions: rest },
});
} catch (error) {
throw error;
}
}),
getInvitations: protectedProcedure.query(async ({ ctx }) => {
return await db.query.invitation.findMany({
where: and(
eq(invitation.email, ctx.user.email),
gt(invitation.expiresAt, new Date()),
eq(invitation.status, "pending"),
),
with: {
organization: true,
},
});
}),
getContainerMetrics: withPermission("monitoring", "read")
.input(
z.object({
url: z.string(),
token: z.string(),
appName: z.string(),
dataPoints: z.string(),
}),
)
.query(async ({ input }) => {
try {
if (!input.appName) {
throw new Error(
[
"No Application Selected:",
"",
"Make Sure to select an application to monitor.",
].join("\n"),
);
}
const url = new URL(`${input.url}/metrics/containers`);
url.searchParams.append("limit", input.dataPoints);
url.searchParams.append("appName", input.appName);
const response = await fetch(url.toString(), {
headers: {
Authorization: `Bearer ${input.token}`,
},
});
if (!response.ok) {
throw new Error(
`Error ${response.status}: ${response.statusText}. Please verify that the application "${input.appName}" is running and this service is included in the monitoring configuration.`,
);
}
const data = await response.json();
if (!Array.isArray(data) || data.length === 0) {
throw new Error(
[
`No monitoring data available for "${input.appName}". This could be because:`,
"",
"1. The container was recently started - wait a few minutes for data to be collected",
"2. The container is not running - verify its status",
"3. The service is not included in your monitoring configuration",
].join("\n"),
);
}
return data as {
containerId: string;
containerName: string;
containerImage: string;
containerLabels: string;
containerCommand: string;
containerCreated: string;
}[];
} catch (error) {
throw error;
}
}),
generateToken: protectedProcedure.mutation(async () => {
return "token";
}),
deleteApiKey: protectedProcedure
.input(
z.object({
apiKeyId: z.string(),
}),
)
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
try {
const apiKeyToDelete = await db.query.apikey.findFirst({
where: eq(apikey.id, input.apiKeyId),
});
if (!apiKeyToDelete) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "NOT_FOUND",
message: "API key not found",
});
}
if (apiKeyToDelete.referenceId !== ctx.user.id) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "UNAUTHORIZED",
message: "You are not authorized to delete this API key",
});
}
await db.delete(apikey).where(eq(apikey.id, input.apiKeyId));
await audit(ctx, {
action: "delete",
resourceType: "user",
resourceId: input.apiKeyId,
resourceName: apiKeyToDelete.name || undefined,
});
return true;
} catch (error) {
throw error;
}
}),
createApiKey: protectedProcedure
.input(apiCreateApiKey)
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
// Verify user is a member of the organization specified in metadata
if (input.metadata?.organizationId) {
const userMember = await db.query.member.findFirst({
where: and(
eq(member.organizationId, input.metadata.organizationId),
eq(member.userId, ctx.user.id),
),
});
if (!userMember) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "FORBIDDEN",
message: "You are not a member of this organization",
});
}
}
const apiKey = await createApiKey(ctx.user.id, input);
await audit(ctx, {
action: "create",
resourceType: "user",
resourceId: apiKey.id,
resourceName: input.name,
});
return apiKey;
}),
checkUserOrganizations: protectedProcedure
.input(
z.object({
userId: z.string(),
}),
)
.query(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
// Users can check their own organizations
// Admins and owners can check organizations of members in their active organization
if (input.userId !== ctx.user.id) {
// Verify the target user is a member of the active organization
const targetMember = await db.query.member.findFirst({
where: and(
eq(member.userId, input.userId),
eq(member.organizationId, ctx.session?.activeOrganizationId || ""),
),
});
if (!targetMember) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "FORBIDDEN",
message: "User is not a member of your active organization",
});
}
// Only admins and owners can check other users' organizations
if (ctx.user.role !== "owner" && ctx.user.role !== "admin") {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "FORBIDDEN",
message:
"Only admins and owners can check other users' organizations",
});
}
}
const organizations = await db.query.member.findMany({
where: eq(member.userId, input.userId),
});
return organizations.length;
}),
createUserWithCredentials: withPermission("member", "create")
.input(
z.object({
email: z.string().email(),
password: z.string().min(8),
role: z.string().min(1),
}),
)
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
if (IS_CLOUD) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "FORBIDDEN",
message:
"Creating users with initial credentials is only available in self-hosted mode",
});
}
if (!ctx.session.activeOrganizationId) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "BAD_REQUEST",
message: "Active organization is required",
});
}
if (input.role === "owner") {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "FORBIDDEN",
message: "Cannot create a user with the owner role",
});
}
return await createOrganizationUserWithCredentials({
organizationId: ctx.session.activeOrganizationId,
email: input.email,
password: input.password,
role: input.role,
});
}),
sendInvitation: withPermission("member", "create")
.input(
z.object({
invitationId: z.string().min(1),
notificationId: z.string().min(1),
}),
)
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
if (IS_CLOUD) {
return;
}
const notification = await findNotificationById(input.notificationId);
const email = notification.email;
const resend = notification.resend;
const currentInvitation = await db.query.invitation.findFirst({
where: eq(invitation.id, input.invitationId),
});
if (!email && !resend) {
throw new TRPCError({
code: "NOT_FOUND",
message: "Email provider not found",
});
}
const host =
process.env.NODE_ENV === "development"
? "http://localhost:3000"
: await getDokployUrl();
const inviteLink = `${host}/invitation?token=${input.invitationId}`;
const organization = await findOrganizationById(
ctx.session.activeOrganizationId,
);
try {
const toEmail = currentInvitation?.email || "";
const orgName = organization?.name || "organization";
const subject = `You've been invited to join ${orgName} on Dokploy`;
const html = await renderInvitationEmail({
email: toEmail,
inviteLink,
organizationName: orgName,
});
if (email) {
await sendEmailNotification(
{ ...email, toAddresses: [toEmail] },
subject,
html,
);
} else if (resend) {
await sendResendNotification(
{ ...resend, toAddresses: [toEmail] },
subject,
html,
);
}
} catch (error) {
console.log(error);
throw error;
}
await audit(ctx, {
action: "create",
resourceType: "user",
resourceId: input.invitationId,
resourceName: currentInvitation?.email || "",
metadata: { type: "sendInvitation" },
});
return inviteLink;
}),
getBookmarkedTemplates: protectedProcedure.query(async ({ ctx }) => {
const result = await db.query.user.findFirst({
where: eq(user.id, ctx.user.id),
columns: { bookmarkedTemplates: true },
});
return result?.bookmarkedTemplates ?? [];
}),
toggleTemplateBookmark: protectedProcedure
.input(
z.object({
templateId: z.string().min(1),
}),
)
.mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
const result = await db.query.user.findFirst({
where: eq(user.id, ctx.user.id),
columns: { bookmarkedTemplates: true },
});
const current = result?.bookmarkedTemplates ?? [];
const isBookmarked = current.includes(input.templateId);
const updated = isBookmarked
? current.filter((id) => id !== input.templateId)
: [...current, input.templateId];
await db
.update(user)
.set({ bookmarkedTemplates: updated })
.where(eq(user.id, ctx.user.id));
return { isBookmarked: !isBookmarked };
}),
});